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TTIP and agricultural trade: The case of tariff elimination and pesticide policy cooperation
Bo Xiong 1
John C. Beghin 2
Abstract
A possible Trans-Atlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) agreement will further
integrate agricultural markets between the United States and the European Union. The
elimination of tariffs and cooperation on sanitary and phytosanitary measures will promote crossAtlantic trade. We empirically estimate the impacts of tariffs and Maximum Residue Limits
(MRLs) on trade in plant products between the two partners. Furthermore, we simulate trade
expansions under plausible negotiation outcomes. We find that a TTIP agreement promotes
cross-Atlantic trade in plant products, in both directions, by over 60% if tariffs are removed and
MRLs are mutually recognized or harmonized to Codex levels.

Keywords: Trans-Atlantic Trade and Investment Partnership, TTIP, maximum residue limit,
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1. Introduction
The first round of the proposed Trans-Atlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP)
negotiations was launched in July, 2013, with the aim to improve market access, regulatory
coherence, and modes of cooperation between the United States (US) and the European Union
(EU) (European Commission, 2015a). Although the TTIP negotiations are ongoing, official press
releases suggest that the removal of tariffs and the minimization of the impacts of sanitary and
phytosanitary (SPS) measures are top priorities. For example, an EU position paper outlines that
one of EU’s goals is to “remove nearly all customs duties on EU-US trade” (European
Commission, 2015b). In addition, both sides strive for a SPS chapter in the potential TTIP
agreement that “builds upon the key principles of the SPS Agreement of the World Trade
Organization (WTO)” (European Commission, 2013).
Average customs duties are generally low between the US and the EU. Nevertheless,
tariffs are higher for agricultural products than for manufactured goods (Josling and Tangermann,
2015). Non-tariff measures including the SPS measures tend to be more stringent in the EU than
in the US. For instance, the EU enforces tougher food safety standards for aflatoxin residues in
food items (Xiong and Beghin, 2012), pesticide residues in food products (Li and Beghin, 2014),
and growth additives in livestock industries such as hormones and ractopamine (Bureau, Marette,
and Schiavina, 1998; Alemanno and Capodieci, 2012). In addition, the EU adopts stricter
regulations on emerging biotechnologies such as genetically modified crops (Moschini, 2008).
Several studies in the literature have assessed the economic impacts of a forthcoming
TTIP agreement, with emphasis on different products and policy reforms. In a report for the
European Parliament, Bureau et al. (2014) project that the removal of tariffs and the 25%
reduction in non-tariff measures will raise EU agri-food export to the US by 60% and import
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from the US by 120%. Beghin, Bureau, and Gohin (2014) find that the removal of tariffs and
tariff-rate quotas in the biofuel and feedstock markets will boost the ethanol and biodiesel sector
in the US and the sugar and isoglucose sector in the EU. Using a computational general
equilibrium model, Cororaton and Orden (2016) report modest gains in agricultural exports in
both economies if the TTIP agreement does not substantially reduce non-tariff barriers. In an
econometric analysis, Arita, Mitchell, and Beckman (2015) find that non-tariff measures are
highly restrictive for agri-food exporters from both the US and the EU. Akgul, Hertel, and
Villoria (2016) examine the possible removal of an EU ban on hormone-treated beef within a
GTAP model accounting for productivity difference among beef processors. They find that beef
trade across the Atlantic would increase by over $400 million a year.
In this article, we focus on two sets of policy reforms that can result from a potential
TTIP agreement: the elimination of tariffs, and the cooperation on Maximum Residue Limits
(MRLs) that govern pesticide residue concentrations in plant products. First, we deploy an
econometric model to estimate the impacts of tariffs and MRLs on the bilateral trade in plant
products between the two trade partners. Second, we simulate the economic gains to US and EU
exporters under two plausible TTIP negotiation outcomes: (1) the removal of tariffs and the
mutual recognition of MRLs; (2) the removal of tariffs and the compliance to Codex MRLs as
recommended by the WTO.
We find that the tariffs significantly constrain cross-Atlantic trade in plant products.
Moreover, we find that the MRLs in both markets raise costs borne by foreign suppliers on the
one hand and sustain import demand on the other. The simulation results suggest that the
elimination of tariffs boosts US import of plant products from the EU by 49%, or $300 million a
year, and US export of plant products to the EU by 38%, or $940 million a year. Finally, the
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mutual recognition of cross-Atlantic MRLs boosts US import of plant products from the EU by
13%, or $79 million a year, and US export of plant products to the EU by 25%, or $635 million a
year. The alignment of each country’s MRLs on Codex MRLs expands across-Atlantic trade
even more. Overall, the gain in export revenue is over 60% for both the US and the EU.
The remainder of the article is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the current
markets and policy instruments pertaining to plant products in the US and the EU. Section 3 uses
an econometric model to quantify the impact of tariffs and MRLs on the bilateral trade between
US, EU, and other trading partners. Section 4 describes data sources and presents estimation
results. Section 5 projects the economic gains from a potential TTIP agreement under different
policy scenarios. Section 6 concludes the article and suggests directions for future research.
2. An overview of trade in plant products and regulatory regimes across the Atlantic
Cross-Atlantic trade in plant products is worth more than $3 billion. 3 In 2012, US import value
of plant products from the EU was $620 million, while US export of plant products to the EU
totaled $2.5 billion. The customs duties are generally low in either market. Specifically, the
simple average tariff for plant products is about 4% in the US and 10% in the EU. However,
sanitary and phytosanitary measures diverge significantly across the Atlantic (Bureau et al., 2014;
Josling and Tangermann, 2015).
In particular, the regulatory regime governing pesticide residues differs substantially
between the two markets. The primary policy instrument is the Maximum Residue Limit, which
sets the maximum permissible rate of concentration for a specific chemical residue in a specific
product. The Codex Alimentarius, a body under the United Nations Food and Agriculture
Organization and the World Health Organization, develops international MRLs based on science.
However, the Codex standards are voluntary in nature, as the WTO acknowledges member
3

Appendix A provides the coverage of products.
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countries’ sovereign right in setting their own standards. Nevertheless, The SPS Agreement of
the WTO encourages its members to use CODEX MRLs whenever they are available.
Neither the US nor the EU is currently in compliance with the Codex standards. In
particular, Li and Beghin (2014) find that the MRLs in the US do not exactly follow Codex
recommendations, but on aggregate are pretty close to them. However, the MRLs implemented
in the EU are considerably more restrictive than the Codex counterparts (see the data section
below for summary values).
3. An econometric analysis of the US-EU trade in plant products
3.1. The econometric specification
In this section, we provide an econometric model to characterize the cross-Atlantic trade in plant
products. Specifically, we extend the model developed by Xiong and Beghin (2014) with
emphasis on the US-EU partnership. In the original model, Xiong and Beghin (2014) use the
MRL stringency index of Li and Beghin (2014) to measure the restrictiveness of MRLs by
product and by nation. In particular, the MRL stringency index is averaged across MRLs
targeting all pesticides and chemicals applicable to a specific product. A higher MRL stringency
index indicates a more restrictive MRL policy. If a country defers its MRLs to Codex, the
stringency index takes the value of one.
More importantly, the model in Xiong and Beghin (2014) accounts for the impacts of
MRLs on both the supply side and the demand side of the market. They find empirical evidence
that a more stringent MRL imposes extra costs on foreign suppliers on one hand, and stimulates
additional demand via quality assurance or information disclosure on the other. With focus on
the US-EU partnership, we extend the model by allowing MRLs in the EU and the US to have
different impacts than the MRLs adopted by other developed nations.
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Specifically, the econometric model is as follows:

ln(Tsijt ) = ( β1 + β 2 I {i = EU } + β3 I {i = US} + β 4 I { j = EU } + β5 I { j = US}) ⋅ ln(1 + tarsij ) +
( β 6 + β 7 I {i = EU } + β8 I {i =US} + β9 I {i = EU } + β10 I {i =US}) ⋅ max{MRLsjt − MRLsit , 0} +
( β11 + β12 I {i =EU } + β13 I {i =US} + β14 I {i =EU } + β15 I {i =US }) ⋅ MRLsjt +

β16Qsit + β17 ln(1 + distij ) + β18 Langij + β19 Bordij + β 20Colij + fe jt + fehit + ε sijt ,
where Tsijt is the trade value of product s in year t from the exporting nation i to the importing
nation j; the function I{} generates an indicator variable that equals one if the bilateral trade
involves EU or US as the importer or the exporter and zero otherwise; and tarsij is the ad
valorem tariff rate imposed by country j on product s from country i. Note that the additional
slopes assigned to the tariffs and MRLs implemented by the US and the EU allow us to focus on
cross-Atlantic policies and outcomes.
On the second line of the above equation, the variable max{MRLsjt − MRLsit , 0} captures
the trade-cost effect of MRLs. That is, exporters overcome additional costs when selling to
countries where the MRLs are more stringent than the counterparts at home. Note that the
bilateral trade is not disrupted when the MRLs are harmonized between the trading partners. 4 As
for the tariff variable, we separately identify the trade-cost effects of MRLs when the EU or the
US is involved as the exporter or the importer.
The variable MRLsjt on the third line of the equation can be interpreted as the demandenhancing effect of the MRL policy for product s in the importing country j. Specifically, a more
restrictive MRL regime stimulates or sustains demand by ensuring quality or addressing
asymmetric information in the agri-food markets (Thilmany and Barrett, 1997). On the last line
of the regression equation, we control for the supply capacity of sector s in the exporting country

4

In the model, the mutual recognition of MRLs would have the same cost-reducing effect as harmonization, as the
divergence in MRLs no longer hinders trade between trading partners.
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i ( Qsit ), the distance between the two trading partners ( distij ), whether the two nations use the
same official language ( Langij ), whether the countries are adjacent ( Bordij ) or have a colonial
tie in history ( Colij ). Finally, we include time-varying importers’ fixed effects ( fe jt ) and timevarying and chapter-specific exporters’ fixed effects ( fehit ) to account for the multilateral trade
resistance terms (Anderson and van Wincoop, 2003). 5
3.2. Data features and the estimation procedure
We utilize the data set in Xiong and Beghin (2014). Specifically, the data covers bilateral trade
records of disaggregated plant products from 61 nations to 20 high-income nations in the years
2007–2008 and 2011–2012. 6 The effectively applied tariffs are retrieved from the MacMap
database. The MRL data as of 2008 is sourced from the Homologa database provided by the
Department of Environment, Food and Rural Affairs in the United Kingdom. The MRL data as
of 2012 originates from the GlobalMRLs databank of Bryant Christie Inc. Other bilateral
variables are retrieved from the CEPII database. The 2007 and 2008 trade series are matched
with MRL stringency indices in 2008 by product and by nation. Similarly, the 2011 and 2012
trade flows are aligned with the MRL stringency measurements as of 2012.
Table 1 shows the summary statistics of the MRL stringency indices in the importing
markets. The MRLs enforced by the EU are highly restrictive. Specifically, the EU MRL index is
1.53 in 2008 and 1.39 in 2012. Since the stringency index of Codex MRLs is one by default, the
MRL regime in the EU is nearly 40% tougher than the international recommendations. The MRL
stringency index in the US is slightly below one in both periods, suggesting that the regulatory
regime in the US is almost equivalent to Codex levels. The MRL polices implemented by other
5

The chapters are defined at the HS-2 levels, whereas the plant products of interest are defined at either HS-4 or
HS-6 levels.
6
See Appendix A for the coverage of products and Appendix B for the coverage of nations.
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importing markets are less restrictive than the EU but tougher than the US or Codex. Although
the MRL information is frequently updated by regulatory bodies across the world, the overall
stringency did not vary substantially from 2008 to 2012.
Table 1. Summary statistics of the MRL stringency indices
MRL stringency index:
2008
2012
Mean
Std. Dev.
Mean
Std. Dev.
EU
1.53
0.37
1.39
0.48
US
0.94
0.40
0.97
0.33
Other high-income OECD nations
1.12
0.48
1.29
0.50
All importing nations
1.15
0.49
1.27
0.49
Note: Appendix B provides the list of importing markets. Codex MRLs have a
stringency index of one.
A prominent feature of bilateral trade records at disaggregated product levels is that zero
trade flows are pervasive. In the dataset, more than 80% of the 315,397 observations correspond
to the absence of trade. To account for the large portion of missing trade, we use the two-step
Heckman procedure to estimate the regression equation. Following Xiong and Beghin (2014), we
choose the common religion variable as the excluded variable to facilitate the identification of
the Heckman procedure. Furthermore, to allow heterogeneity in the self-selection process across
different agricultural sectors, we also include the interaction terms of the excluded variable and
the fixed effects at the HS-2 chapter level.
4. Results and discussions
4.1. Estimation results and marginal effects
We focus on the marginal effects of the tariffs and MRLs in this section, while leaving the
estimated coefficients to Appendix C. 7 Specifically, Table 2 shows the marginal effects of tariffs
and MRLs along the intensive margin of trade. That is, the impacts on the trade volumes given

7

One can verify from Appendix C that the estimated coefficients of other trade costs bear the expected signs, except
for the effect of common border on the probability of trade partnership.
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that bilateral trade already takes place. We later define the marginal effects of tariffs and MRLs
along the extensive margin.
Table 2. Marginal effects of tariffs and MRLs along the intensive margin
US as exporter
EU as exporter
3rd country exporter
US as importer
Tariff
-7.846*** (1.107) -7.476*** (1.090)
MRL: demand enhancement
n.a.
1.682*** (0.179) 1.543*** (0.159)
MRL: trade cost
-1.274*** (0.261) -0.599**
(0.235)
EU as importer
Tariff
-2.408*** (0.367)
MRL: demand enhancement 0.379*
(0.199)
MRL: trade cost
-0.670*** (0.208)

n.a.

-2.489***
0.697***
-0.347***

(0.207)
(0.066)
(0.073)

3rd country importer
Tariff
-0.846** (0.338) -1.296*** (0.256) -0.926*** (0.138)
MRL: demand enhancement -0.086
(0.215) 0.370*** (0.125) 0.232**
(0.105)
MRL: trade cost
0.626*** (0.236) 0.275*
(0.165) 0.950*** (0.128)
Note: The marginal effects correspond to the estimated coefficients with correction for selfselection to trade. Standard errors are in parentheses. The notations *, **, and *** represent the
10%, 5%, and 1% levels of significance respectively.
As shown in Table 2, tariffs significantly impede agricultural trade cross the Atlantic.
The tariff elasticity of US import from the EU is over -7, and the tariff elasticity of US export to
the EU is -2.4. In an earlier study, Bureau et al. (2014) also find that the tariff elasticity of crossAtlantic agricultural trade is well above one. With US-EU trade flows excluded, the marginal
effect of tariffs on trade volumes among third countries is nearly one.
Next, we attend to the marginal effects of MRLs in Table 2. We find that the MRL
policies in either the US or the EU exhibit dual effects. That is, the MRLs impose extra costs on
foreign suppliers as well as sustain demand for imports via information disclosure or quality
assurance. In particular, the MRLs in the US affect market participants more profoundly than the
MRLs in the EU. The plausible reason is that the harmonization of MRLs among EU member
states has reduced the disruptions of MRLs within the common market. In addition, we find that
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the MRLs adopted by other high-income nations generally promote imports of plant products.
However, the positive trade-cost effects of MRLs implemented by third nations are unexpected.
One possible explanation is that these MRLs impose more costs onto domestic producers than
foreign suppliers. As a result, a more stringent MRL regime further diminishes the
competitiveness of the agricultural sectors. 8
As a complement to Table 2, Table 3 presents the marginal effects of tariffs and MRLs
along the extensive margin of trade. That is, the impacts on the likelihood of trade partnership.
The effects along the extensive margin are of particular interest when certain policies impose
substantial costs on foreign suppliers and therefore drive vulnerable exporters out of the market
altogether. The reduction or removal of these prohibitive measures expands the variety of
products traded in the world market or the number of nations participating in international trade.
Table 3. Marginal effects of tariffs and MRLs along the extensive margin
US as exporter
EU as exporter
3rd country exporter
US as importer
Tariff
-4.527*** (0.555) -4.861*** (0.547)
MRL: demand enhancement
n.a.
1.069*** (0.102) 1.097*** (0.094)
MRL: trade cost
-0.850*** (0.152) -0.569*** (0.138)
EU as importer
Tariff
MRL: demand enhancement
MRL: trade cost

-1.541***
-0.039
-0.157

(0.235)
(0.127)
(0.130)

n.a.

-1.852***
0.291***
0.025

(0.112)
(0.037)
(0.042)

3rd country importer
Tariff
-0.237
(0.222) -0.214*
(0.125) -0.548*** (0.079)
MRL: demand enhancement -0.249*
(0.141) 0.053
(0.072) 0.081
(0.062)
MRL: trade cost
0.382**
(0.147) 0.283*** (0.095) 0.564*** (0.075)
Note: The marginal effects correspond to the changes in the log-likelihood of trade partnership in
response to changes in the explanatory variables. Standard errors are in parentheses. The notations
*, **, and *** represent the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels of significance respectively.
As shown in Table 3, tariffs lower the likelihood of the occurrence of trade across the
8

See Marette and Beghin (2010) for a conceptual model capturing the impacts of standards on comparative
advantages.
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Atlantic. The result suggests that the elimination of tariffs will expand the variety of plant
products traded between the US and the EU. Moreover, the increase in variety will be more
substantial in the US market than in the EU market, probably because the diversity of EU
imports is more constrained by non-tariff measures in the EU. We also find that the MRLs in the
US affect the propensity of both US importers and EU exporters. In contrast, the MRLs in the
EU do not affect EU-US partnership and even make EU’s sourcing from third countries more
likely. 9 As in Table 2, we find no evidence that the MRLs enforced by third nations suppress the
probability of trade.
In summary, the marginal effects in Table 2 and Table 3 provide a quantitative
assessment of the impacts of tariffs and MRLs on the across-Atlantic trade in plant products. The
overall effects of trade liberalization can be derived by combining the marginal effects along
both margins of trade. In the next subsection, we simulate the potential gains to agricultural
exporters in the US and the EU, under possible policy environments implied by a forthcoming
TTIP agreement.
4.2. Simulation results and policy implications
The gradual removal of all import duties and the cooperation on non-tariff measures are
high priorities in the ongoing TTIP negotiations. Although a duty-free market across the Atlantic
is a preferred outcome by both sides, the risk perceptions and assessments of other public
policies such as the SPS measures differ greatly between the US and the EU markets. We
consider two plausible policy scenarios resulting from the TTIP negations. In the first scenario,
tariffs are eliminated and the both markets consider the MRLs effective in the other market
equivalent to the domestic standards (i.e., mutual recognition). In the second scenario implied by
9

The finding lends support to the idea that non-tariff measures addressing market imperfections can be trade
catalysts rather than impediments. See the 2012 World Trade Report of the WTO for a survey of non-tariff measures
and multilateral trade issues. https://www.wto.org/english/res_e/publications_e/wtr12_e.htm
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the TTIP agreement, cross-Atlantic tariffs are removed and both the US and the EU defer their
MRLs to the Codex counterparts. Under this negotiation outcome, the TTIP agreement would be
consistent with the SPS Agreement and Technical Barriers to Trade Agreement of the WTO.
Table 4 shows the simulated trade expansions due to a TTIP agreement in both scenarios.
Table 4. Expansions in across-Atlantic trade in plant products
TTIP outcome 1:
TTIP outcome 2:
mutual recognition
Harmonization to Codex MRLs
Gains to US exporters
From tariff elimination
38%
38%
From MRL changes
25%
26%
Gains to EU exporters
From tariff elimination
49%
49%
From MRL changes
13%
21%
Note: The trade expansions account for the increase in trade volumes (or the intensive margin)
and the increase in trade likelihood (or the extensive margin).
As shown in Table 4, the elimination of tariffs promotes US export to the EU by 38%, or
$940 million a year based on the trade record as of 2012. Similarly, the tariff removal boosts US
import from the EU by 49%, or $300 million a year. Note that the simulated trade expansions do
not incorporate potential feedback effects from field crops to processed food items such as meat
and dairy products along the supply chain.
Next, we discuss the expansions of trade induced by cross-Atlantic cooperation on MRL
policies. Under the first negotiation outcome, the US and the EU mutually recognize the MRLs
adopted in the other market. The equivalence of MRLs exempts exporters from incurring
additional costs in order to penetrate the other market. We expect that US exporters benefit more
from mutual recognition than EU exporters because the current MRL regime is tougher in the
EU than in the US (recall Table 1). At the same time, the mutual recognition might lead EU
consumers to perceive US imports as inferior. Such changes of risk or quality perceptions in the
EU are likely to weaken the demand for US imports. As shown in Table 4, the mutual
Page 13 of 21

recognition of MRLs raises US export to the EU by 25%, or $635 million a year, and US import
from the EU by 13%, or $79 million a year.
Under the second TTIP negotiation outcome, both the US and the EU endorse the Codex
MRLs. This implies a substantial relaxation of MRLs in the EU and a slight strengthening of
MRLs in the US (recall Table 1). The adherence to a common set of MRLs spares exporters from
overcoming extra hurdles when selling across the Atlantic. As in the case of mutual recognition,
we expect US exporters to gain more than EU exporters because a more stringent regulatory
regime is currently effective in the EU. In addition, the relaxation of MRLs in the EU suppresses
EU demand, as European consumers adjust their risk and quality perceptions. Similarly, the
strengthening of MRLs in the US is likely to enhance the demand for plant products in the US.
According to Table 4, US export to the EU increases by 26%, slightly higher than in the case of
mutual recognition. The reason is that European consumers perceive US imports as less inferior
when the US strengths its MRLs to meet Codex recommendations. Finally, we find that US
import from the EU rises by 21%, higher than13% under mutual recognition. The reason is that
the US compliance with Codex enhances US demand for plant products. Overall, the crossAtlantic trade in plant products expands by more than 60%, in either direction, in response to a
comprehensive TTIP agreement that addresses both tariffs and non-tariff measures. 10
5. Conclusions
The ongoing TTIP negotiations between the US and the EU are expected to bring forth a broadbased trade agreement that further integrates the two markets. The proposed cooperation ranges
from the gradual removal of bilateral customs duties to the convergence of regulatory regimes
across the Atlantic. The agricultural sectors on both sides will be profoundly affected by a TTIP
10

Jean and Bureau (2016) report that currently effective regional trade agreements have promoted world trade in
food products by 30% to 40%. Our simulation results suggest that the TTIP agreement would stimulate more trade
than previous regional trade pacts.
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agreement as policies affecting the agri-food industries diverge substantially between the two
markets.
We investigate the impact of a potential TTIP agreement on the cross-Atlantic trade in
plant products, with emphasis on the elimination of tariffs and the convergence of MRLs that
regulate pesticide residues. Deploying a state-of-the-art econometric model, we find that the
elimination of tariffs boosts US import of plant products from the EU by $300 million a year and
US export of plant products to the EU $940 million a year. Furthermore, the mutual recognition
of MRLs raises US import of plant products from the EU by $79 million or $130 million a year,
and US export of plant products to the EU by $635 million or $661 million a year. The
endorsement of Codex MRLs by the US and the EU has the potential to release even more trade
opportunities.
We foresee several extensions to the current research. First, the proposed model can be
used to evaluate other policies interfering with agricultural trade across the Atlantic. For example,
one could consider the reconciliation of SPS measures governing food and feed additives and
antibiotic residues in animal products. Second, the possible trade-diversion effects of a TTIP
agreement are of great interest to stakeholders and policy makers beyond the US and the EU. In
particular, it is worth exploring whether the expansion of cross-Atlantic trade is at the expense of
diminished export opportunities faced by less developed nations. In addition, future research
could go beyond trade growths and investigate the welfare implications of the TTIP agreement.
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Appendix A
Table A. Names of plant products, based on the Harmonized System
Chapter Description
Product names (HS 4 or 6 digits)
HS-06
live trees & other plants
canna, chufa, dasheen
HS-07
edible vegetables
artichoke, asparagus, bean*, broccoli, Brussels
sprouts, bulb onion, cabbage, cassava(roots), celery,
chickpea, chicory(tops), chrysanthemum, cucumber,
eggplant, endive, garden beet(roots), garlic, green
onion, lentil, lettuce(head), lettuce(leaf), mushroom,
non-bell pepper, olive, pea*, potato, spinach, squash,
sweet potato, tomato, turnip
HS-08
edible fruits & nuts,
almond, apple*, apricot , avocado, blueberry,
peel of citrus/melons
beechnut, Brazil nut, cantaloupe, cashew, cherry,
chestnut, coconut, date, dry prune plum , fresh prune
plum, grape, grapefruit, guava, hazelnut, kiwifruit,
kumquat, loquat, nectarine, orange, papaya, peach,
pear, pineapple, pistachios, plantain, raisin,
strawberry*, tangelo, walnut, watermelon,
youngberry*
HS-09
coffee, tea, mate & spices ginger, pepper, summer savory
HS-10
Cereals
barley, corn, corn salad, lupin, millet*, oat, rice,
sorghum, wheat
HS-12
oil seeds/ misc. grains/
cotton seed, hop(dried cones), mustard spinach,
med. plants/ straw
peanut, sesame seed, sugar beet (roots)
Note: Products with * have multiple matches in the HS classifications.
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Appendix B

Table B. List of importing and exporting countries
Importing countries
Exporting countries
Australia

New
Zealand

Algeria

Dominican Rep.

Israel

Pakistan

Thailand

Belgium

Portugal

Argentina

Ecuador

Italy

Panama

Trinidad/
Tobago

Canada

Rep. of
Korea

Australia

Egypt

Jamaica

Peru

Tunisia

Denmark

Spain

Bahamas

El
Salvador

Japan

Philippine

Turkey

Finland

Sweden

Barbados

Finland

Jordan

Poland

United
Arab
Emirates

France

United
Kingdoms

Belgium

France

Kenya

Portugal

United
Kingdoms

Germany

United
States

Brazil

Germany

Lebanon

Rep. of
Korea

United
States

Greece

Canada

Greece

Malaysia

Russia
Venezuela
Federation

Ireland

Chile

Guatemala Mexico

Singapore

Israel

China

Honduras

Morocco

South
Africa

Italy

Columbia

Hong
Kong

Netherlands

Spain

Japan

Costa
Rica

Indonesia

New
Zealand

Sri Lanka

Vietnam

NetherDenmark
Ireland
Nicaragua Sweden
lands
Note: Importing countries are selected OECD members with nominal per-capita GDP over
$20,000 as of 2012. Source: International Monetary Fund.
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Appendix C
Table C. Estimated coefficients of high-income OECD’ imports of plant products
Variables
Outcome equation
Selection equation
Coefficient
Std. Err
Coefficient
Std. Err
MRL: Demand
enhancement
⊗ EU as importer
⊗ EU as exporter
⊗ US as importer
⊗ US as exporter

0.232**

0.105

0.039

0.030

0.466***
0.138
1.312***
-0.318

0.113
0.129
0.176
0.121

0.101***
-0.014
0.489***
-0.159**

0.032
0.035
0.049
0.064

MRL: Trade cost
⊗ EU as importer
⊗ EU as exporter
⊗ US as importer
⊗ US as exporter

0.950***
-1.296***
-0.674***
-1.549***
-0.324

0.128
0.134
0.159
0.254
0.217

0.271***
-0.259***
-0.135***
-0.545***
-0.087

0.036
0.038
0.044
0.072
0.065

ln(1+tariff)
⊗ EU as importer
⊗ EU as exporter
⊗ US as importer
⊗ US as exporter

-0.926***
-1.562***
-0.370
-6.549***
0.080

0.138
0.234
0.263
1.094
0.342

-0.263***
-0.627***
0.161**
-2.074***
0.149

0.038
0.063
0.063
0.265
0.108

1.209***
0.016
0.229***
0.001
ln(Production)
-2.262***
0.051
-0.617***
0.008
ln(Distance)
0.488***
0.110
-0.251***
0.033
Border
0.612***
0.057
0.129***
0.016
Colony
0.984***
0.049
0.302***
0.012
Language
3.608***
0.100
--Inverse Mills Ratio
Number of obs.
58,603
315,397
Note: The notation ⊗ represents the interaction with the following indicator variable. The year-specific
importers’ fixed effects and the year-specific and chapter-specific exporters’ fixed effects are included
in the regressions but omitted from the table for brevity. Chapter-specific common religion variables
are used as the excluded variables in the Heckman two-step procedure. Notations **, and *** denote
significance levels at 5% and 1% respectively.
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